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BE COOL!  STAYING OPEN MINDED ABOUT 
CLIMATE POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
SCOTT H. SEGAL† 
In the competition for the limited attention span that the 
American polity devotes to environmental issues, there can be no 
doubt that global climate change is in a category by itself.1  
Regardless of relative position on the political spectrum, the 
American public and its leaders have come to agree on once 
controversial elements of the climate narrative.  Discussion of the 
greenhouse effect and its implications were once the boutique 
musings of environmental policy wonks.  No longer.  A major motion 
picture,2 an Academy Award,3 a Nobel Prize,4 not to mention 
frequent appearances throughout the popular culture, have elev
 † The author is a partner and co-head of the government relations and strategy section at 
the law firm of Bracewell & Giuliani LLP.  JD, University of Texas – Austin; BA – Emory 
University.  Mr. Segal previously taught environmental law and policy development at the 
University of Maryland (University College).  He is indebted to the entire Bracewell team 
working on climate change policy, including Jeff Holmstead, Dee Martin, Josh Zive, Lisa 
Jaeger, Ed Krenik, Rich Alonso and Mike McNerny. 
 1. Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1, 44-46 (2007) (discussing public opinion regarding climate change).  While Sunstein 
cites survey data showing that the American public opinion does not support drastic action on 
climate change or any environmental topic for that matter, he does concede that media 
attention on climate change and its symbols has been gaining momentum throughout the 1990s.  
Id. 
 2. An Inconvenient Truth (Paramount Pictures 2006).  Actually, two motion pictures, if 
you count The Day After Tomorrow (20th Century Fox Studios 2004). 
 3. The Oscars, Winner: Documentary Feature, http://www.oscar.com/oscarnight/winners/ 
?pn=detail&nominee=AnInconvenientTruthDocumentaryFeatureNominee (last visited Feb. 
24, 2007).  Former Vice President Albert V. Gore offered the following remarks on accepting 
the Academy Award, “Thank you.  I want to thank Tipper and my family, thank the Academy 
and everyone on this amazing team.  My fellow Americans, people all over the world, we need 
to solve the climate crisis.  It’s not a political issue, it’s a moral issue.  We have everything we 
need to get started, with the possible exception of the will to act, that’s a renewable resource.  
Let’s renew it.” Id. 
 4. Vice President Gore received a share of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for his work on 
global climate change.  His acceptance speech can be viewed and read on his blog posting, I Am 
Deeply Honored, AL GORE, Oct. 12, 2007, http://blog.algore.com/2007/10/i_am_deeply_ 
honored.html. 
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Now that an emerged consensus advocating action forms the 
basis of the climate discussion, we need only discuss a principled basis 
for deciding among proposed policy solutions to address the problem.  
As Mencken remarked, however, complex problems often have 
solutions that are “neat, plausible and wrong.”5  Unfortunately, given 
the proven and purported environmental and economic impacts 
associated with climate policy, the consequences of being wrong are 
significant.  Policy makers are well advised to be at least as careful in 
joining in any policy consensus as they were in accepting a scientific 
one. 
This essay will examine briefly the common ground of the 
emerged political consensus to take action on climate change.  Then, 
we will briefly review the current options to address climate change—
with a particular emphasis on exploring incentives-based concepts.  
Next, the essay will address the downside consequences of an 
improperly calibrated climate change policy.  And last, we will 
conclude with upsides—environmental, energy and economic—of 
properly addressing the opportunity presented by innovative climate 
change policy. 
I.  THE EMERGED CONSENSUS 
Not long ago, the climate narrative was dominated by the story 
that climatic history could be divided into glacial and interglacial 
periods—ice ages and temperate ages.6  The notion was that Earth 
was nearing the end of its current interglacial period—the one 
responsible for the development of current human culture.  A 
combination of anthropogenic emissions and activities were hastening 
the arrival of the next ice age.  Concerted international action was 
needed; at the very least, reexamination of the primacy of economic 
growth was in order.7 
Since that time, the climate narrative has changed.  The 
consensus view, as expressed by the United Nation’s 
 5. H.L. Mencken’s full remark is, “There’s always an easy solution to every human 
problem—neat, plausible, and wrong.”  H.W. LEWIS, TECHNOLOGICAL RISK 48 (1990) (citing 
H.L. Mencken). 
 6. David S. Chapman & Michael G. Davis, Global Warming— More Than Hot Air?, 27 J. 
LAND, RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L. 59, 59-60 (2007).  For a general discussion of climactic periods, 
see id. at 59-77. 
 7. See, e.g., LOWELL PONTE, THE COOLING (1976) (quoting climatologist Stephen 
Schneider on the back cover as stating that this “well-written book” hypothesizing global 
cooling may support the notion that “massive world-wide actions to hedge against that threat 
deserve immediate consideration”). 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)8 and others, is 
that the Earth is in the grips of a warming trend, or a perceptible 
increase in the average mean temperature of the atmosphere.  As far 
as the science goes, “the debate on global warming is over.”9  Indeed, 
one study has found that three quarters of all climate studies support 
the essential principles that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) are increasing, that warming is occurring, and that 
human activity plays a contributing role.10  Questions regarding the 
rate of change and the extent to which controls on emissions will help 
still exist.  But, unsurprisingly, most agree that concerted 
international action is needed; at the very least, reexamination of the 
primacy of economic growth is in order.11 
There is as much hubris in stating that climate science is perfect 
as there is in stating that it is without merit.  It is perhaps most useful 
to simply say that climate science is robust enough to support the 
political consensus for action.  As a corollary, it is no longer useful to 
lodge purely scientific arguments as the basis to reject the adoption of 
proposals designed to reverse or at least ameliorate the consequences 
of climate change.  As Professor Richard Pierce has written, “I now 
rate the probability that the anthropogenic global warming hypothesis 
is true at around 90%. . . . It is time to shift most of the public debate 
from whether anthropogenic global warming is real to what we should 
do about it.”12 
There is a central irony behind the recently emerged political 
consensus: for all the blood, sweat and intellectual tears spilled in the 
climate debate, was it needed after all?  Scholarship and commentary 
on climate change has come to the fore in roughly the same time 
 8. Elisabeth Rosenthal & James Kanter, Alarming UN Report on Climate Change Too 
Rosy, Many Say, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 18, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/ 
11/18/europe/climate.php?page=2 (stating that “most scientists have been awed by the IPCC’s 
deliberate work”). 
 9. Gary Stix, A Climate Repair Manual, SCI. AM., Sept. 2006, at 46. 
 10. Naomi Oreskes, Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 
Science, Dec. 2004, http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/306/5702/1686 (writing that 75 
percent of the 928 abstracts listed in the Institute of Scientific Information between 1993 and 
2003 that contained “climate change” as a key word either explicitly or implicitly endorsed the 
consensus viewpoint); see also Daniel J. Grimm, Global Warming and Market Share Liability: A 
Proposed Model for Allocating Tort Damages among C02 Producers, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
209, 212 (2007). 
 11. See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust: A Legal, Political and Moral Frame for 
Global Warming, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 577, 587-89 (2007). 
 12. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Energy Independence and Global Warming, 37 ENVTL. L. 595, 
597 (2007). 
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frame as scholarship and commentary on the diminishing supplies of 
key fossil fuels13 and the security risks presented by continuing 
reliance on foreign sources of supply.14  All of these trends counsel 
policy makers to take the same course: diversify our sources of energy 
and deploy new technologies.15  In any event, these simultaneous 
strands of public argument seem to be largely mutually reinforcing—
at least on the need for action. 
II.  OPTIONS CURRENTLY ON THE TABLE 
A quick screening of the film An Inconvenient Truth16 yields 
another truth: the vast majority of the film dwells on the science and 
consequences of climate change.  Very little of the film dwells on 
solutions, save cursory statements that flash during the closing 
credits.17  In that sense, the award-winning film is a reasonable 
facsimile of the actual state of policy analysis.  With the seeming 
acquiescence of the press, much of the climate discourse in the 
current Presidential campaign has focused on general statements on 
the issue; little attention has been paid to the nuances of the policy 
options.18 
 13. See, e.g., M. King Hubbert, Nuclear Energy and the Fossil Fuels Mar. 7-9 1956, 
http://www.hubbertpeak.com/hubbert/1956/1956.pdf.  Scholarship regarding the “peak oil” 
hypothesis has been gathering currency roughly since the work of M. King Hubbert in the mid-
1950s.  The peak theory posits that there exists a rough bell curve in the amount of available 
crude petroleum and natural gas reserves, and that current production is on the downside of 
that curve.  For recent support, see John Donnelly, Price Rise and New Deep-water Technology 
Opened Up Offshore Drilling, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 2005, at A36 (quoting an ExxonMobil 
exploration official, who stated, “All the easy oil and gas in the world has pretty much been 
found”).  The peak theory may be approaching consensus.  See Russell Gold & Ann Davis, Oil 
Officials See Limit Looming On Production, WALL STREET J., Nov. 19, 2007, at A1 (“A 
growing number of oil-industry chieftains are endorsing an idea long deemed fringe: The world 
is approaching a practical limit to the number of barrels of crude oil that can be pumped every 
day.  Some predict that, despite the world’s fast-growing thirst for oil, producers could hit that 
ceiling as soon as 2012.”). 
 14. See MILTON R. COPULOS, THE NAT’L DEF. COUNSEL FOUND., AMERICA’S ACHILLES 
HEEL THE HIDDEN COSTS OF IMPORTED OIL 7 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ndcf.org/ 
(finding in part that “as long as America remains heavily dependent on imported crude, its 
national security remains jeopardized”). 
 15. Id. at 108. 
 16. An Inconvenient Truth, supra, note 2. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See, e.g., How Green Is Your Candidate? Interviews and info on the presidential 
candidates’ environmental positions, GRIST, Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.grist.org/feature/ 
2007/07/06/candidates/ (describing early Clinton campaign positions on climate as “vague about 
solutions” and Obama campaign positions as “largely platitudinous on energy and climate” and 
noting both have since become more detailed).  Initially, the Presidential campaigns were 
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There are a number of reasons why open and honest discussion 
of public policy response has been so limited.  Perhaps copy and 
images related to policy just don’t touch the popular zeitgeist in the 
same way as the symbolism of science, from floods to storms to polar 
bears.19  Perhaps the adoption of policy is not without costs, and the 
imposition of costs likely to be reflected in the price of energy may 
well have regressive impacts on those in society least able to afford 
it.20  Or perhaps developing credible and cost-effective policy 
acceptable to the public is just plain hard.21 
Despite the lack of truly definitive analysis, policy makers—
particularly those in Congress—seem most enamored with the 
concept of an emissions cap coupled with a trading regime.22  Such an 
largely symbolic in their discussion of climate change. Id.  They were less than clear about 
specific policy proposals, although each has since released more detailed proposals.  Id.  Despite 
releasing more detailed plans, there has been little public discourse comparing these policies.  
The media has not forced the issue in any meaningful way.  See Kim Zetter, Al Gore makes 
impassioned plea to TEDsters, WIRED.COM, Mar. 3, 2008, http://blog.wired.com/business/ 
2008/03/al-gore-makes-i.html (citing data gathered by former Vice President Al Gore on “the 
number of questions that broadcast media outlets posed to presidential candidates last year 
[2007] about the climate crisis”).  NBC’s top journalists asked 956 questions of the candidates, 
but only two of them were about the climate crisis.  Id.  ABC journalists asked 844 questions; 
two of which were about the crisis.  Id.  Fox and CNN also asked two questions on the topic, and 
CBS had “asked none.”  Id.  In a general sense, failure to discuss specific policy in detail should 
come as no surprise given the “ebb and flow” of campaign rhetoric.  See BRUCE BUCHANAN, 
RENEWING PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: CAMPAIGNS, MEDIA, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 74 
(1996) (noting that “‘politics as usual’ will always bid strongly to supplant issue campaigns” in 
part because the personal and negative components of modern campaigns “usually marginalize 
the issues discussion by reducing the attention issues get in the media, which is more attracted to 
the ebbs and flows of political combat than to policy substance”). 
 19. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 46 (discussing the centrality of the need to associate climate 
change with “a cognitively ‘available’ event [that] . . . might well lead to a substantial increase in 
concern”). 
 20. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 881-82 (2005-
06) (“[A]ny significant effort to curtail global warming would impose significant hardships, 
especially on poor people, who are least able to bear the relevant cost increases.”). 
 21. See Daniel Yankelovich, How Public Opinion Really Works, FORTUNE, Oct. 5, 1992, 
available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1992/10/05/76926/index.htm 
(“Wrestling with complex issues—abortion, the death penalty, immigration, censorship, 
environmental protection, homelessness, as well as health care—requires getting in touch with 
one’s deepest values and often realizing that these may conflict with one another on a particular 
question.  People naturally resist having to compromise or abandon cherished values.”). 
 22. The Impact of America’s Climate Security Act of 2007 (S. 2191) on the U.S. Economy 
and on Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Envt. and Public 
Works, 110th Cong. 5, (2008), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction= 
Files.View&FileStore_id=132d40b2-ff1d-4dcc-a58d-022c80aa824d (statement of, Margot 
Thorning, Ph.D., Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Amer. Coun. for Capital 
Formation) [hereinafter “Thorning Statement”].  Thorning claimed the proposition that success 
of Acid Rain program and start of European trading program have caused many in Congress to 
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approach would set a hard and declining limit on greenhouse gas 
emissions from the principal emitting sectors in the economy.23  Those 
reducing beyond the cap would generate credits that could be traded 
to those that cannot quite meet the cap.24 
Doubtless, the greatest attraction of cap and trade regimes in the 
climate change context is the generally accepted success of a cap and 
trade program in reducing emissions that cause acid rain.25  This line 
of analysis contends that all policy makers need do is “plus up” the 
acid rain program adopted under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990 in order to produce a ready-made policy response to climate 
change.  Indeed, proponents of stringent caps even claim that because 
some in industry opposed the acid rain program prior to 1990, and 
because the program worked, such industry objections to GHG caps 
should be viewed through a skeptical lens today.26 
Despite the great success of earlier trading programs, there is no 
doubt that correctly calibrating a cap-and-trade program for GHG 
emissions will be challenging.  Yale economist William Nordhaus has 
raised several specific obstacles to a well-functioning trading program 
in the climate context, summarized as follows: 
Such a program would require nations to make coordinated 
decisions about emissions baselines that would be difficult or 
impossible to make.  It would create so much uncertainty about the 
future prices of emissions permits that trade in permits would be 
severely impaired.  A global cap and trade system would also 
express support for cap-and-trade program for GHG emissions.  Id. (citing Ian W.H. Parry & 
William A. Pizer, Emissions Trading Versus CO2 Taxes, WEATHERVANE, May 2007, 
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/Backgrounders/RFF-BCK-TradingvsTaxes.pdf ). 
 23. Description of cap and trade programs proposed in the current Congress can be found 
at Larry Parker & Brent D. Yacobucci, Greenhouse Gas Reduction: Cap-and-Trade Bills in the 
110th Congress, CONG. RES. SERV. REPT. NO. RL33846, at 1 (Jan. 31, 2008), available at 
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Dec/RL33846.pdf (“In general, these proposals 
would create market-based greenhouse gas reduction programs along the lines of the trading 
provisions of the current acid rain reduction program established by the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments.”). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Zachary Coile, ‘Cap-and-Trade’ Model Eyed for Cutting Greenhouse Gases, S.F. 
CHRON., Dec. 3, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/ 
12/03/MNMMTJUS1.DTL. 
 26. Id. (noting proposals are based on 1990 Acid Rain program).  However, comparisons to 
the 1990 Acid Rain program can be highly problematic.  See id. (“[A]ny effort to limit 
greenhouse gases will be an order of magnitude bigger and more costly than the acid rain 
program.  While the acid rain initiative was focused on just one pollutant, sulfur dioxide 
(nitrogen oxides were later added), the new proposals seek to limit carbon dioxide and five 
other pollutants.  The acid rain program focused on electricity producers, while the new efforts 
would affect utilities, large manufacturers and the transportation sector as well.”). 
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produce highly volatile energy prices and be characterized by 
transactions costs so high they would impair its efficacy.  Finally, 
Nordhaus fears a global cap and trade system would be plagued by 
pervasive corruption.27 
Despite any reservations in the literature, however, there can be 
little doubt at this point that a trading program for GHG emissions 
will at least be part of any solution.  The architecture of such an 
approach is familiar to both the regulated community and the public 
interest community, as well as to government officials likely to 
implement the program.  That said, a “simmering debate” has 
erupted over the use of carbon tax schemes as an alternative to 
trading programs.  Cap-and-trade policies “set an overall limit—
squeezed lower and lower over time—on the amount of”28 GHG 
emissions, and then allow for trading.  By contrast: 
A carbon tax reverses the process.  The government would impose 
a tax on carbon output, gradually raising the price of energy 
produced from fossil fuels to higher and higher levels.  The cost of 
coal would go up the most, because it emits more carbon dioxide 
for each unit of energy, with the price rising less for products 
derived from oil like gasoline and jet fuel, and even less for natural 
gas.  The money raised by the tax, ideally, would be used to offset 
other taxes in ways that could compensate lower-income 
households and minimize damage to the economy.29 
Many economists seem to believe that a carbon tax would be “a 
superior policy alternative to an emissions-trading regime.”30  This is 
because of the tax’s ability to enhance administrative effectiveness, 
efficiency, the right-sizing of incentives, the minimization of 
corruption, the relative ease of regulatory burden, and so on.31  
However, even as academic and policy discussion pitting trading 
regimes against taxes has flourished, trading regimes continue in the 
ascendancy, if for no other reason than the public’s aversion to tax 
increases.  This appears to be so, even if a trading regime behaves like 
 27. Pierce, supra note 12, at 600-601 (citing William D. Nordhaus, After Kyoto: Alternative 
Measures to Control Global Warming, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 31, 31-34 (2006)). 
 28. Tom Redburn, The Real Climate Debate: to Cap or to Tax?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/us/politics/04web-redburn.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Kenneth P. Green, Stephen F. Hayward, and Kevin A. Hassett, Climate Change: Caps 
v. Taxes, AMER. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL. RESEARCH, ENVT’L POLICY OUTLOOK, June 1, 
2007, available at http://www.aei.org/include/pub_print.asp?pubID=26286. 
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a form of tax anyway, with the government collecting revenue from 
auctioned credits and redistributing the funds as it sees fit.32 
While there is a healthy intellectual exchange on the pros and 
cons of trading programs and carbon taxes, it appears that these are 
the only principle tools under discussion.  It has been suggested that 
the use of modern environmental decision-making essentials could 
yield no other result. Both a cap-and-trade program and a taxation 
scheme, along with forerunner concepts of traditional command-and-
control regulation, share in common the notion that interposition of 
government will is a superior approach to the creation of positive 
incentives to induce social change.  Ted Nordhaus and Michael 
Shellenberger have postulated that environmental thinkers have 
trapped themselves in “the politics of limits” and are still searching 
for ways to apply existing beliefs in innovation and entrepreneurship 
to the desire for positive environmental outcomes.33 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger suggest that pollution control 
strategies alone are insufficient to address as sweeping an 
international problem as global climate change.  Instead, society must 
stand ready to implement the incentives of the marketplace as a 
central feature of a comprehensive solution.  They write: 
[O]vercoming global warming demands something qualitatively 
different from limiting our contamination of nature.  It demands 
unleashing human power, creating a new economy, and remaking 
nature as we prepare for the future.  And to accomplish all that, the 
right models come not from raw sewage, acid rain, or the ozone 
hole but instead from the very thing environmentalists have long 
imagined to be the driver of pollution in the first place: economic 
development.34 
Any approach to addressing climate change—no matter what the 
balance of incentives to mandates—must encourage technological 
innovation fit to the task of transforming society.  One observer has 
noted that, as it currently stands, there is “no magic Tylenol that will 
cure this temperature rise overnight, because carbon dioxide can 
 32. Pierce, supra note 12, at 601 (“Many politicians and business leaders prefer a cap and 
trade system to a carbon tax, but those preferences are based on dubious reasoning.  Many 
politicians prefer cap and trade because it allows them to avoid the dreaded ‘t’ word.  They 
either do not realize, or prefer to ignore, the reality that cap and trade imposes a ‘tax’ that is 
functionally identical to a carbon tax.  Either mechanism can be effective only by increasing the 
price of carbon-dioxide emitting activities by the same large amount.”). 
 33. TED NORDHAUS AND MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE 
DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 31-40 (Houghton Mifflin 
2007). 
 34. Id. at 113. 
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persist in the atmosphere for up to a few centuries.”35  This, of course, 
is the central flaw in the products of prior international efforts to 
address climate change.  Left unaddressed at Kyoto was the notion 
that climate change requires “an energy technology revolution on a 
global scale” that would facilitate significant reductions in GHG 
emissions at “acceptable costs.”36  Available experience from 
international efforts to regulate ozone-depleting substances further 
underscores the point: it was only at the point that practical 
technological alternatives were clearly on the horizon that an 
international treaty limiting chlorofluorocarbons became 
acceptable.37 As we shall see, proceeding with a regulatory regime 
before technology is reasonably available is fraught 
III.  THE PROBLEM OF “CHOOSING POORLY” 
In the film classic Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade,38 the 
villain must choose among various options to identify the Holy Grail.  
Tantalized by the shiny, jeweled choice, he turns to dust.  An aging 
knight, observing the mess, states wryly, “He chose . . . poorly.”39  
Given what’s at stake in the context of global climate change policy, 
we had better hope for a more salubrious outcome.  The 
consequences of “choosing poorly” are potentially
nvironmental Consequences 
In evaluating the environmental consequences of poorly 
calibrated regulatory schemes to reduce GHG emissions, we must 
begin by asking what is to be gained if the scheme performs as hoped.  
Even if the Kyoto Protocol had performed as hoped, climate models 
indicate that the mechanism may have only delayed the onset of 
global warming by seven days by the end of this century.  Even 
 35. Wood, supra note 11, at 581. 
 36. Richard E. Benedick, Avoiding Gridlock on Climate Change, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY, Jan. 9, 2007, available at http://www.issues.org/23.2/p_benedick.html. 
 37. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 63-64 (“[T]echnological innovation is highly desirable as a 
means of reducing the costs of regulation [of greenhouse gases].”).  Indeed, Sunstein contends 
based upon experience with ozone-depleting substances, that “[t]echnological innovation led 
the world to believe it had less to lose from regulation than it originally feared.”  Id. at 34. 
 38. Jeff Boam, Screenplay to “Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade” (Paramount Pictures 
1989), available at http://www.scifiscripts.com/scripts/Indiana3.txt. 
 39. Id. 
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assuming the United States and Australia had signed on ab initio, 
effects would only be postponed by five years by the end of this 
century.40  Put another way, the consequences of global warming will 
continue “even if we stop emitting all greenhouse gases tomorrow.”41  
The importance of these observations is not that they counsel 
policymakers to do nothing; rather, they suggest that no climate 
policy42 can be expected to gain the benefits of reversing climate 
change in any complete sense, and that such policies are more 
defensible if they can be embraced on a “no-regrets” basis.43  A no-
regrets policy yields energy, security or envi
mate benefits ultimately prove dubious. 
One reason that U.S. climate policy might fail to produce the 
desired environmental effect is that unilateral action on the part of 
the United States does not guarantee the participation of developing 
nations, including China and India.44  In particular, China’s 
extraordinary rate of industrialization45 over the last few decades has 
made its emissions particularly problematic.46  By some estimates, 
China has already overtaken the United States in GHG emissions, 
 
 40. Bjorn Lomborg, Chill Out: Stop Fighting Over Global Warming—Here’s the Smart Way 
to Attack It, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2007, at B1. 
 41. NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 33, at 13.  See also Sunstein, supra note 1, 
 
 geoengineering 
vailable at 
ate change prove less severe than feared”). 
: Rule of Law, Politics of Enforcement, 
as four times the 
nese production). 
at 33 (describing “meager effect” of Kyoto Protocol in “reducing anticipated warming”); 
Chapman & Davis, supra note 6, at 72 (stating that even stabilization requires halving 
emissions). 
 42. A possible exception to this statement would be the adoption of
proposals, including iron fertilization, stratospheric sulfur injection, space-based mirrors, and 
the like.  However, “[n]one of these geoengineering solutions . . . is cost effective, and many 
have other environmental drawbacks.”  Chapman & Davis, supra note 6, at 71. 
 43. Joshua W. Busby, Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT NO. 32, Nov. 2007, at 11, a
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/ClimateChange_CSR32.pdf (calling on the 
United States to “prioritize so-called no-regrets policies, those that it would not regret having 
pursued even if the consequences of clim
 44. NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 33, at 12 (“China and India long ago 
rejected any approach to addressing climate change that would constrain their greenhouse gas 
emissions or their economic growth.”). 
 45. Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dagon
and Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
267, 270 (2007) (noting the “runaway economic growth” growth of China that w
growth rates of advanced economies during the 1990s). 
 46. Id. at 271 (noting that the EPA found that more than twenty-five percent of the 
atmospheric pollution on the U.S. West Coast relates to Chi
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is on track to account for some forty percent of total global GHG 
emissions by 2020.47 
The importance of China and other developing nations in 
assessing the environmental consequences of U.S. policy cannot be 
overstated.  As Pierce has observed, “[a]ny effort that excludes major 
nations would be an expensive exercise in futility.  It would yield 
more geographic redistributions of emissions than reductions in 
emissions.”48  Sunstein notes that “[f]or the United States, unilateral 
action to comply with the Kyoto Protocol may well produce no 
benefits at all . . . .”49  Such redistribution of productive
a could make matters even worse for the environment, given the 
comparative lack of institutional environmental controls.50 
Some have argued that the United States must lead by example, 
potentially drawing recalcitrant nations along in its wake.51  While this 
outcome is possible, so is its opposite.  Unions for Jobs and the 
Environment, a group of ten major U.S. labor organizations and a 
non-governmental observer accredited by the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change,52 has argued that if 
environmental advocates “were to succeed in . . . forc[ing] unilateral 
reductions in the US, without regard to foreign policy, the US would 
lose an important source of foreign policy leverage; namely, the 
 
 47. Geraldine Tyrrell, Chinese Pollution Control Laws: Moving Towards Sustainable 
Development?, 10 ASIA PAC. J. ENVTL. L. 67, 69 (2007); see also Keith Bradsher, China to Pass 
can be thwarted when emitters in other 
ir emissions.”). 
cal protectionism” that prevents it from enforcing even 
s o
ate.com/cgi-
H.DTL&hw=boxer&sn=003&sc=787 
f, supra note 48, at 1-2. 
U.S. in 2009 in Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2006, at C1. 
 48. Pierce, supra note 12, at 600.  See also Unions for Jobs and the Environment, Amicus 
Brief at 7, Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 
[hereinafter UJAE Brief] (“GHG emissions from all sources in all nations contribute to an 
undifferentiated worldwide concentration in the upper atmosphere . . . . Therefore, the potential 
benefit of GHG emission reductions made in the US 
nations increase or refuse to reduce the
 49. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 34. 
 50. See Sitaraman, supra note 45, at 335 (citing China’s “lack of strong centralized 
environmental administration” and its “deep-seated political unwillingness to disrupt economic 
growth, combined with corruption and lo
it wn environmental standards). 
 51. See Andrew C. Revkin, As China Goes, so Goes Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
2007, at 4.3 (quoting BinBin Jiang, a research associate in energy and development at Stanford 
University, who stated, “‘China is clearly responsible for the largest wedge of emissions in the 
future, but the United States is still the biggest roadblock.  The U.S. is not going to be influential 
by telling China what to do.  It has to lead by example’”).  See also Zachary Coile, Emissions 
Bill Heads to Fight on Senate Floor, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 6, 2007 (citing U.S. Sen. John Warner, 
stating, “If we don’t act, China and India will simply hide behind America’s skirts of inaction 
and take no steps of their own”), available at http://www.sfg
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/12/06/ MNIBTP0Q
 52. UJAE Brie
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this 
amages.  A 
massive investment overseas in regulatory programs could even have 
 resources available for needed climate 
adap
 
ability to insist on commitments by other nations as a precondition 
for its own GHG reductions.”53  The Supreme Court has recognized
exact strategy, withholding unilateral action as leverage, as a 
principled basis for preempting inconsistent state action.54  At oral 
argument in Massachusetts v. EPA, Justice Alito raised the concern.55 
The policy challenge of addressing climate change in many parts 
of the world includes not just emissions control but also adaptation to 
the effects of climate change.  Even assuming full compliance with 
environmental controls in developing nations, there still may be 
heightened impact associated with climate-related d
the perverse effect of reducing
tation programs56 or disease prevention programs.57 
B. Economic Consequences 
Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), one of the principal 
architects of climate change legislation currently pending before the 
U.S. Senate, has been refreshingly candid about the impact of his 
proposed legislation on certain sectors of the economy, noting that 
the bill would cost “hundreds of billions” of dollars over the next few 
decades.58  Unfortunately, these compliance costs are not borne 
equally across the U.S. economy.  Those in society least able to afford 
increased prices of energy and manufactured goods will be hurt the 
most by poorly calibrated carbon caps.  In particular, the elderly, 
 53. Id.  at 26. 
 54. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376 (2000) (finding that 
forbearance from domestic action constitutes foreign policy because without such forbearance 
“the President has less to offer and less economic and diplomatic leverage as a consequence”); 
see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi 539 U.S. 396, 427 (2003). 
 55. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 
1438 (2007) (Justice Alito references the “view that for the United States to proceed unilaterally 
would make things worse and therefore they’re going to decline to regula[te] for that reason”), 
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-1120.pdf. 
 56. Lomborg, supra note 40, at B1 (“If we focus instead on environmental concerns and, 
for instance, adopt the hefty cuts in carbon emissions many environmental groups promote, this 
could reduce the rise by about five inches.  But cutting emissions comes at a cost: Everybody 
would be poorer in 2100.  With less money around to protect land from the sea, cutting carbon 
emissions would mean that more dry land would be lost, especially in vulnerable regions such as 
Micronesia, Tuvalu, Vietnam, Bangladesh and the Maldives.”). 
 57. Id. (“According to scientific models, implementing the Kyoto Protocol for the rest of 
this century would reduce the malaria risk by just 0.2 percent.  On the other hand, we could 
spend $3 billion annually—2 percent of the protocol’s cost—on mosquito nets and medication 
and cut malaria incidence almost in half within a decade.”). 
 58. Thorning Statement, supra note 22, at 5. 
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those living on fixed incomes, and those living at or near the poverty 
level have a greater proportion of their income dedicated to energy-
related expenses, rendering the impact of carbon caps potentially very 
regressive.59  Even when cap-and-trade programs are designed t
te some portion of proceeds to the poor, most of the cost of the 
cap is still borne by consumers.60  This problem persists even when 
creative mechanisms are employed to distribute carbon allowances. 
The precise economic impacts that can be attributed to a climate 
change policy vary greatly depending on the details of the legislation 
and the assumptions made in the economic models employed.  For 
example, there has been no authoritative government analysis of the 
economic impact of S.2191, legislation introduced by Senator 
Lieberman and Senator John Warner (R-VA).  One analysis 
conducted by Charles River Associates (CRA) has found that near-
term price increases related to the bill’s implementation “would be 
disruptive to the economy, and cause a painful transition.”61  CRA 
also found a potential increase of some 36 percent to 65 percent in 
wholesale electricity prices alone, continuing to rise by 2050 to the 
range of an 80 percent to 125 percent increase.62  The bottom line 
economic assessment: U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) could b
r in 2015 by about $160 billion to $250 billion.  Eventually, found 
CRA, the annual loss in GDP attributable to the Lieberman-Warner 
legislation would increase to the range of $800 billion to $1 trillion.63 
Large-scale negative economic consequences, regressively borne 
by American consumers, should give policy makers some pause.  For 
cost of this magnitude also creates the potential for a vicious cycle in 
which economic consequences tamp down the potential of the 
economy to stimulate technological innovation.  As the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology found, “the overall health of 
 59. Sunstein (2006), supra note 20, at 881; see also Scott Segal, Public Hearing Statement of 
the Electric Reliability Coordinating Council, Mar. 7, 2006, available at 
http://www.electricreliability.org/vc.php?cid=81 (“If regulations force utilities to shift from coal 
to natural gas, the result is predictable.  As Catholic Charities of Cleveland has testified that, 
‘the conversion to natural gas from coal would have a devastating effect on the people of Ohio 
and our country, particularly the poor and the elderly.’”). 
 59. Thorning Statement, supra note 22, at 6. 
 60. Id. 
 61. The Impact of America’s Climate Security Act of 2007 (S. 2191) on the U.S. Economy 
and on Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Environment  
and Public Works, 110th Cong. 6 (2008) (statement of Dr. Anne Smith) [hereinafter “Smith 
Statement”]. 
 62. Id. at 9. 
 63. Id. at 6. 
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ls in the near term—say, from coal to more 
exp m 
tech ing 
desc
deployment of new technology for the generation 
of electricity, transportation, energy efficiency and emissions control 
ressing global climate change in any 
mea
combination of demand-side management and renewable energy will 
likely be able to replace any substantial portion of that capacity any 
time in the near future.68  Second, policies designed to reduce GHGs 
the U.S. economy will affect the pace of innovation across all 
industries and technologies.  A strong economy increases the pool of 
capital available for the purchase of new technology and for 
investment by companies in R&D.”64  Unfortunately, the potential for 
carbon caps to penalize carbon-emitting technologies cannot be seen 
as a reliable incentive for development of new, cleaner technology.  
Because carbon caps have the potential to cause power generators 
simply to switch fue
ensive natural gas—the caps divert capital away fro
nological innovation and into costly fuels.  Margo Thorn
ribes the result: 
Caps on emissions are not likely to promote new technology 
development because caps will force industry to divert resources to 
near-term, “end of pipe” solutions rather than promote spending 
for long-term technology innovations that will enable us to reduce 
GHGs and increase energy efficiency.  An emission trading system 
will send exactly the wrong signals to investors because it will 
create uncertainty about the return on new investment.65 
A loss of innovation is more than just a complication: the 
development and 
are essential prerequisites to add
ningful way.66 
C. Energy Policy Consequences 
There are certain immutable facts that any energy policy must 
take into account for the United States.  First, coal-fired electric 
power represents over half of U.S. electric generating capacity.67  No 
 
 64. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DIVISION ON ENGINEERING AND RESEARCH 
CI
GHG emissions and a strong economy tends to pull through capital investment faster.”). 
S ENCES, COMMITTEE ON FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS, FUTURE R&D ENVIRONMENTS: A 
REPORT FOR THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 131 (2002). 
 65. Thorning Statement, supra note 22, at 6. 
 66. See Redburn, supra note 28; see also Thorning Statement, supra note 22, at 9 
(“Technology development and deployment offers the most efficient and effective way to 
reduce 
 67. H. Sterling Burnett, Coal Power in the Black, Texas Public Policy Foundation 
Commentary, Dec. 7, 2006, http://www.texaspolicy.com/commentaries_single.php?report_id= 
1236. 
 68. Jeffrey W. Moore, The Potential Law of On-Shore Geologic Sequestration of CO2 
Captured from Coal-Fired Power Plants, 28 ENERGY L.J. 443, 485 (2007) (“Coal is essential to 
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through inflexible regulatory or tax mechanisms can result in 
significant fuel-switching away from coal to natural gas or other more 
expensive energy sources.69  Removing coal from the energy mix can 
directly undermine the reliability and affordability of electricity for 
consumers and businesses.70 
One study conducted by researchers at Pennsylvania State 
University (PSU) has attempted to estimate the rough economic 
benefits of maintaining coal as a viable part of the fuel diversity of the 
United States.71  The PSU team assumed a replacement of coal-fired 
capacity with more costly alternatives, such as natural gas and a ten 
percent renewables mix.  Even when the positive impacts of 
investment in gas and renewables is netted out, the study found that 
by 2015: 
• The annual benefit of coal use at currently projected levels is 
estimated at more than $1 trillion in gross domestic product 
(GDP), $360 billion in additional household income and 
nearly 7 million jobs. 
• In contrast, a 33 percent reduction in coal-fired electric 
power generation would reduce GDP by $166 billion, 
household income by $64 billion and employment by 1.2 
million below what it otherwise would be. 
foreseeable energy production, and there are no viable substitutes readily available.”); Burnett, 
supra note 67 (“Coal is a secure energy source, since the United States contains more than a 
 a result, coal-fired power plants generate 52 percent of the electricity in the 
n
s would 
ffer the 
tion while ensuring reliability and affordability”). 
KO, supra note 69, at 1. 
quarter of the world’s recoverable reserves, equaling a 250-year supply at current rates of 
consumption.  As
U ited States.”). 
 69. See EUGENE M. TRISKO, NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, BRIEF ANALYSIS NO. 
573, ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC HEALTH BENEFITS OF COAL-BASED ENERGY 1 (2006), available 
at http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba/ba573/ba573.pdf (“[D]omestic and international proposals to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions would force utilities to shift electricity production from coal to 
other sources of generation.  For example, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the 
U.S. Department of Energy estimated the climate change plan proposed by Sen. John McCain 
(R-Ariz.) and Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) in 2004 would reduce coal use by 59 percent to 
78 percent.”); Burnett, supra note 67 (“[P]roposals to reduce greenhouse gas emission
force utilities to shift electricity production from coal to other sources of generation.”). 
 70. See BERNARD L. WEINSTEIN AND TERRY L. CLOWER, OUR ENERGY FUTURE: THE 
NEED TO EXPAND AND DIVERSIFY TEXAS POWER GENERATION 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.unt.edu/cedr/PowerDiversification.pdf (demonstrating that “fuel diversity . . . [in] 
generation mix” is necessary to maintain “affordable and reliable electricity to households and 
business in the years ahead” but noting that in the near term, “base-load coal plants o
best opportunity to achieve diversifica
 71. TRIS
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71 billion, household 
income by $142 billion and employment by 2.7 million.72 
 the PSU study were not limited to 
any 
ices.  Of greater interest here are health 
end-
• A 66 percent reduction in coal-fired electric power 
generation would reduce GDP by $3
The negative impacts discussed in
one particular region of the United States. 
D. Public Health Consequences 
There are ways, of course, in which improved energy efficiency 
itself can result in unintended consequences for public health.73  
However, to the extent society has already chosen a course to 
encourage efficiency, these health end-points are either deemed 
reasonable in pursuit of broader public policy goals or are themselves 
addressed by other policy cho
points that are exacerbated by the choice of climate policy 
options that could otherwise be avoided by choosing a more 
sensitively calibrated option. 
One endpoint of concern again relates to potential 
macroeconomic impacts associated with significant fuel switching.  In 
1979 and 1984, the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress 
authorized research by Dr. M. Harvey Brenner at the Johns Hopkins 
University to demonstrate the relationship between unemployment 
rates and public health.74  That work yielded a strong correlation, 
showing that each one percent increase in the unemployment rate 
resulted in a two percent increase in premature death.75  In 2005, 
Brenner updated his work.  The Brenner econometric model, applied 
to economic conditions likely to result from fuel-switching and based 
upon over 50 years of U.S. health and economic data, yielded 
significant results.  Specifically, he found that “the estimated 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. It has been argued that increased efficiency for automobiles may decrease the vehicle 
size, thus making occupants for susceptible to injury or death in the event of accidents.  See, e.g., 
Thomas Gale Moore, The Unresolved Conflict Between Auto Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 1 J. OF 
REG. & SOC. COSTS 71, 72 (1990).  Making your home more energy efficient can trap pollutants 
inside that can be 100 times higher than ambient air pollution.  See, e.g., Morris Carey, Indoor 
Pollution Just as Damaging, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Feb. 8, 2008, available at 
http://www.dailyherald.com/story/?id=129918. 
 74. See M. HARVEY BRENNER, JOINT ECON. COMM., 94TH CONG., ESTIMATING THE 
SOCIAL COSTS OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTAL AND PHYSICAL 
HEALTH AND CRIMINAL AGGRESSION (1979); see also M. HARVEY BRENNER, JOINT ECON. 
COMM., 98TH CONG., ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE ON NATIONAL 
HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING (1984). 
 75. See BRENNER, ESTIMATING THE SOCIAL COSTS OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, 
supra note 74. 
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Util n 
data n 
resu
Regardless of where on the spectrum mortality associated with 
the economic dislocat e change policy may 
fall, 
ophysicists David Chapman and Michael 
Dav
critical element in convincing the developing world to adopt new 
ways of doing things.  Our experience with ozone-depleting 
substances showed that a critical mass of support for an international 
 
additional mortality in the year 2010, based on four different 
variations of the model, ranges from an additional 170,507 to 368,915 
deaths for the displacement of 100% of coal-based generation.  The 
author’s moderately conservative estimate is based on an annual 
change model at 195,308 deaths”76  A
tality projections assumes rather substantial fuel-switching
izing the more conservative Energy Information Administratio
 taken from an earlier analysis of pending climate legislatio
lted in the following conclusion: 
Given an estimated potential displacement of 78% of U.S. coal 
generation based on EIA’s study of proposed climate change 
initiatives, the indicated premature mortality from reduced income 
and increased unemployment would exceed 150,000 deaths 
annually, absent direct and effective mitigation programs.78 
ion resulting from climat
policy makers should still endeavor to minimize these impacts—
particularly if constructive and effective climate policy still results. 
IV.  THE OPPORTUNITY 
The way to address the challenge of global climate change is by 
no means to passively adopt a business-as-usual position.  “There is 
an alternate path,” write ge
is.  “We could unleash our engineering, economic, and political 
entrepreneurs to improve energy conservation and efficiency and 
move us towards greater use of renewable energy sources.”79  The 
question, of course, is how. 
With a political consensus already hardening around trading 
regimes, it would be foolish not to learn all we can about how to 
appropriately structure such programs.  However, if we are relying on 
innovation and new technology to eventually provide solutions, it is 
also wise to ask what combination of policies—and in what order—
maximizes the potential return on our policy investment.  There is no 
doubt that the encouragement of new technological development is a 
 76. See TRISKO, supra note 69, at 2. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Chapman & Davis, supra note 6, at 59. 
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n intensive, energy-production stage of 
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 hiring a 
lawy
ves-based policy initiative might contain the following 
st aspects of current state and 
t place the United States on a glide path of 
stabilization; 
 
regime was achieved only after technological innovation had 
produced tangible results.80 Ultimately, the development and 
diffusion of new technology could even allow developing nations to 
“skip the carbo
strialization.”81 
While the time developing a cap-and-trade program is potentially 
well spent, it makes sense to first focus on the basket of policy options 
that might constitute an incentives-based approach to climate change 
policy.  Former Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA), in recent debate 
with Senator John Kerry (D-MA) over global climate change policy, 
put it this way: “the morning you provide the incentives, it’ll be 50,000 
entrepreneurs figuring out how to get the money.  The morning you 
try to do it by regulation, there’ll be 50,000 entrepreneurs
er to fight you.  It’s a fundamentally different model.”82 
The “fundamentally different model” must take into account the 
fact that carbon dioxide and other GHG emissions are unlike other 
pollutants we have faced in the past.  The range of activities, 
economic sectors, lack of ready alternatives, and other factors dictate 
not a “go-slow” approach, but perhaps a “go-different” approach.83  
An incenti
measures: 
i. An accurate assessment of GHG emissions in the form of a 
registry modeled on the be
federal reporting programs; 
ii. A set of reasonable milestones for GHG emission 
reductions tha
 80. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 34 (“We might find a parallel to the process that led to the 
Montreal Protocol, as technological innovation led the world to believe that it had less to lose 
from regulation than it originally feared.”). 
 81. Chapman & Davis, supra note 6, at 59. 
 82. Senator John Kerry & Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Debate at the NYU 
Brademas Center for the Study of Congress: Global Climate Change and the Environment 15 
(April 10, 2007), available at http://www.nyu.edu/brademas/pdf/Kerry-
Gingrich_Federal_News_Service_transcript.pdf (transcript). 
 83. See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 
52,922, 52,928 (denied Sept. 8, 2003) (“It is hard to imagine any issue in the environmental area 
having greater ‘economic and political significance’ than regulation of activities that might lead 
to global climate change.  Virtually every sector of the U.S. economy is either directly or 
indirectly a source of GHG emissions. . . .  The production and use of fossil fuel-based energy 
undergirds almost every aspect of the U.S. economy.”); Wood, supra note 11, at 585 
(“Transitioning to a carbon-free society is more complicated than our previous experience with 
CFCs because it involves nearly every sector of society.”). 
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iii. The development of a tax incentive policy or policies to 
encourage the use of, and investment in, near-term 
technologies that are reasonably available; 
iv. The development of loan guarantees to encourage the use of 
and investment in longer-term technologies that are not 
currently off-the-shelf; 
v. The development of public-private partnerships with 
dedicated funding sources to encourage more basic research 
in areas critical to addressing the climate challenge; 
vi. The development of policies to enhance the diffusion of new 
technologies to markets in the developing world; 
vii. Periodic program evaluation designed to monitor the extent 
to which incentives are creating the basis for substantial 
progress towards the achievement of GHG emission 
reduction goals; and 
viii. The development of a regulatory alternative—a cap-and-
trade program with adequate cost containment—to phase 
in, in the event that incentives do not produce the requisite 
forward momentum. 
The last suggested step is indicative of the notion that incentives-
based policies and regulatory policies are not inherently inconsistent, 
provided that they are appropriately phased.  No policy maker would 
willingly run the gauntlet of economic consequences described in this 
essay if an incentives policy could place the country on a glide path to 
successful emissions reductions first.  While sources of revenue will be 
needed for an incentives-based policy, directly targeting the 
encouragement of technology may be far more cost-effective than 
adopting a cap first and merely hoping for innovation instead of fuel-
switching.  Even if the United States and other nations committed 
0.05 percent of their respective GDPs to investments and incentives 
for new technology—from new generation to capturing carbon—it 
would amount to a ten-fold increase in global research and 
development.84  And it would be some seven times cheaper than 
attempting to fully implement the Kyoto Protocol.85 
Tax incentives, loan guarantees, bonds, and other strategic 
government investments, in partnership with private sector actors, 
can awaken new technological possibilities and can accelerate gains in 
 84. Lomborg, supra note 40, at B1. 
 85. Id. 
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energy efficiency and emissions control.86  Already, policy makers are 
focusing on concepts like these in order to minimize the consequences 
of proscriptive regulation described here, while truly addressing 
climate change. 
Senator George Voinovich (R-OH) recently delivered the 
keynote address at a meeting of the National Commission on Energy 
Policy.  He noted that a bipartisan group of Senators was working on 
a proposal “to encourage the development of new technologies” by 
use of appropriate tax treatment for companies that develop new 
technologies, loan guarantees, and international technology transfer 
reform.87  At the same meeting, the Democratic staff director of the 
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee agreed that cap-
and-trade legislation may stall for political reasons, thus providing an 
“ideal situation” for an incentives-based proposal.88 
Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) recently announced a new 
proposal that would set up the “Clean Energy Investment Bank of 
the United States,” modeled on governmental financial institutions 
such as the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation.89  The proposal would 
provide “a variety of financing tools” to encourage investment in 
renewable energy, carbon capture and sequestration, new nuclear 
technology and other applications.90 
Perhaps not unlike climate science itself, creating incentives 
packages properly calibrated to achieve environmental success is an 
inexact science.  The mechanism described in this essay or the two 
proposals already under development seem like steps in the right 
direction.  While the total dollar amount needed is difficult to 
estimate, one analysis has found that a domestic investment of $15 to 
$30 billion a year in clean-energy research and development would 
stabilize carbon emissions and would also foster appropriate market 
dynamics that would allow the investments to pay for themselves 
 86. Thorning Statement, supra note 22, at 11-13. 
 87. Anthony Lacey, Voinovich Touts ‘Incentives’ As Bipartisan Alternative To Cap-And-
Trade, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Jan. 24, 2008, http://carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ 
ccn/show/voinovich_touts_ incentives_as_bipartisan_alternative_to_cap_and_trade/. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Ben Geman, Domenici Unveils Plans for Federal ‘Clean Energy’ Bank, ENV’T & 
ENERGY DAILY, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/2008/03/03/5. 
 90. Id. 
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thereafter.91  Another estimate from the Electric Power Research 
Institute finds that an investment of approximately $17 billion 
between now and 2025 would be sufficient to undertake the steps 
necessary to achieve near-zero emissions (SO2, NOx, mercury, 
particulates, and CO2) from the use of coal.
92 
Regardless of which roadmap is chosen, there is ample evidence 
that a portfolio of public and private investments can target the actual 
endpoints necessary to stabilize GHG emissions.  Rather than 
sacrificing considerable productive assets in the U.S. economy, a well-
designed incentive-based policy can “offer the promise of creating a 
vibrant new industry capable of driving economic growth for decades 
to come.”93  And if predictions such as these began a slow divergence 
from reality, policy makers can always reserve the right to implement 
a cap-and-trade program or a carbon tax. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is not the intention of this essay to paint an unduly pessimistic 
picture of the challenges ahead for climate change policy 
development.  First, as a society, we are already well along the path of 
modifying behavior in order to react to a carbon-constrained world. 
The United States arguably leads the world in reducing the energy 
intensity of its economy, meaning that less energy is being consumed 
for each unit of production.94  U.S. consumers are purchasing record 
 91. See NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 33, at 124; see also Daniel Kammen, 
The Rise of Renewable Energy, SCI. AM., Sept. 2006, at 92 (discussing an analysis produced by 
the Renewable and Appropriate Energy Laboratory University of California at Berkeley). 
 92. COAL UTILIZATION RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE CURC-EPRI ROADMAP: CLEANER, 
AFFORDABLE, MORE EFFICIENT ENERGY FROM COAL 2 (Nov. 2007), http://www.coal.org/ 
UserFiles/File/Roadmap_-_November_2007.pdf (“With successful technology development and 
increased federal funding, new coal-based power generation technologies can be demonstrated 
by 2025 that control emissions, including CO2, while generating electricity at a cost no greater 
than today’s modern power plants that are not equipped with CO2 controls.”). 
 93. NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 33, at 124. 
 94. Steven F. Hayward, The United States and the Environment: Laggard or Leader?, AEI  
ENVTL. POL’Y OUTLOOK, No. 1, Feb. 2008, available at http://www.aei.org/publications/ 
pubID.27548/pub_detail.asp (“The consistent improvement in America’s energy efficiency is an 
untold and underappreciated long-term story. . . . In fact, some evidence suggests the United 
States is currently outperforming Europe in reducing energy intensity (the amount of energy 
used per unit of economic output) and greenhouse gases.  According to the Department of 
Energy’s latest annual report on the subject, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions fell by 1.5 percent in 
2006, the first time they have fallen in a nonrecessionary year.  It is likely that the United States 
is the only industrialized nation whose greenhouse gas emissions fell in 2006.”). 
  
328 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 18:307 
 
numbers of hybrid vehicles95, energy-efficient appliances, and 
insulation96.  Second, this essay does not reject the use of regulatory 
approaches, trading regimes or carbon taxes.  Rather, it recognizes 
these policy options as part of a complex puzzle.  Regulatory 
approaches should not be undertaken lightly, must be calibrated to 
avoid the worst predictable consequences, and perhaps should be 
phased so that incentives-based policies can be tested first.  Last, and 
most importantly, the basis of the American economy and the quality 
of life dependent upon it are closely tied to the entrepreneurial spirit 
and innovation of market participants.  This essay posits that it is 
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